Today marks one month since the dramatic U.S. operation in Venezuela that captured Nicolás Maduro, the country’s president, and brought him to New York City to face federal drug trafficking charges.
While many details about the operation are clearer now than they were in the immediate aftermath, it remains uncertain how the sudden change in Venezuela might shape long-term political, economic, and institutional dynamics—both within the country and across the region.
To better understand this uncertainty and identify trends to watch moving forward, we asked three RAND experts to discuss why Venezuela remains critical for Latin America, how regional players are responding to change in Caracas, the nature of the U.S.-Venezuela relationship, and more.
Q: Why is Venezuela’s political trajectory so consequential for Latin America?
TAHINA MONTOYA Because the crisis extends beyond Venezuela’s borders. Prolonged authoritarian rule has imposed severe costs on Venezuelans, including rising living expenses and widespread human rights abuses, while also driving large-scale migration and enabling criminal and armed actors. At the same time, Venezuela has become a case study for how the United States, hemispheric partners, and adversaries respond, with critical implications for regional norms, security cooperation, and broader hemispheric security.
MARIE JONES Venezuela has become Latin America’s most closely watched case of democratic erosion followed by uncertain political reconfiguration. Its trajectory matters not only because of its size, resources, and population, but because it shapes regional expectations about whether deeply captured states can recover democratic governance. Venezuela’s experience influences norms around executive power, electoral integrity, and the role of security forces in politics. Materially, its instability has driven the largest displacement crisis in the region’s modern history, straining neighboring governments and regional institutions.
KELLY PIAZZA Venezuela’s fate reverberates across the region. Once one of Latin America’s most prosperous democracies, its turn toward authoritarianism and economic collapse has impacted neighboring states through mass migration, humanitarian challenges, and shifts in regional alliances—developments that have strained social systems and reshaped domestic politics across the region. Additionally, Venezuela has long functioned as a key supporter and partner of other authoritarian regimes in the region, most notably Cuba. Its ongoing political turmoil and economic deterioration directly influence the stability and resources of its allies, while also serving as a cautionary tale of how comparable regimes might experience strain or unravel under similar conditions. More broadly, Venezuela’s experience informs broader regional debates about governance, democracy, nationalization, and relations within the hemisphere.
Q: What are the most plausible scenarios for Venezuela over the next one to three years?
MONTOYA Whatever comes next for Venezuela will require a deliberate, phased strategy and sustained cooperation to avoid further instability and enable lasting change. While a political transition remains possible, recent rhetoric from interim President Delcy Rodríguez suggests that this path remains fragile. Any credible way forward must incorporate the voices of Venezuelans most affected by the crisis. Their perspectives are essential to restoring governance, addressing security challenges, and achieving durable outcomes.
JONES Several scenarios appear plausible in the near term. One is a form of managed authoritarian continuity, in which political power is redistributed within existing elite networks without meaningful democratization. Another is a partial political opening—such as limited electoral reforms or negotiated power-sharing—that stops short of full democratic transition. A more ambitious scenario would involve a negotiated political reconfiguration leading to competitive elections and institutional rebuilding.
PIAZZA Recent events illustrate that “regime decapitation does not equal regime change.” Although Nicolás Maduro has been replaced by Delcy Rodríguez, most of the ruling structure remains intact. As a result, little has shifted on the ground. The same security forces patrol the streets, fear continues to silence dissent, and state media spouts its familiar propaganda.
Although Venezuela could eventually progress toward a democratic transition—whether organically or through a negotiated arrangement in which Chavista leaders agree to elections under domestic and international pressure—the most plausible near-term scenario remains the persistence of a deeply entrenched authoritarian system marked by ongoing instability.
Q: How have countries around Latin America responded over the last month? How do you see them adjusting to shifts in Venezuela moving forward?
MONTOYA Latin American governments have fallen into four categories as Venezuela’s crisis has unfolded. The first group is made up of states that support Maduro’s removal as a blow to authoritarianism and criminal networks (e.g., Argentina). The second group condemns the move as a violation of sovereignty and international law (e.g., Colombia). A third group remains cautious, prioritizing stability, border security, and spillover risk (e.g., Panama). And a fourth group reflects mixed or internally divided positions (e.g., Chile). These divergent responses are likely to persist, making credible solutions for Venezuela critical as developments could either mitigate or aggravate hemispheric instability.
Q: What about Cuba? Does Maduro’s ouster bring the island’s regime and fragile economy closer to collapse, as many observers have speculated?
JONES Any sustained disruption to Cuba’s economic and energy lifeline from Venezuela increases pressure on an already fragile Cuban economy. However, collapse is not inevitable. Havana has shown resilience before, notably during the “Special Period” following the collapse of the Soviet Union, by adapting to external shocks through rationing, diversification of partners, and internal controls. The more immediate effect is heightened economic stress and political risk, rather than sudden regime failure. Much depends on how Venezuela’s energy and foreign policy orientations evolve.
PIAZZA Allies and partners have undeniably been pivotal in sustaining Cuba’s regime. The reduction in Venezuela’s oil supplies has placed significant pressure on Havana, worsening power outages, living conditions, and adding to strain, more broadly. The regime’s endurance partially hinges on how other nations react to U.S. efforts to isolate and pressure Cuba. Nevertheless, there are strong reasons to believe it will persist as it has for decades: The government remains effectively “coup-proofed,” without a unified or institutionalized opposition, and benefits from both robust mechanisms of repression and a capable intelligence network.
MONTOYA Cuba has long relied on Venezuelan energy and economic support. With that support now sharply reduced, shortages in basic needs are likely to drive internal instability. Given that Cuba is just 90 miles from the United States, instability on the island carries direct security implications, especially as the ongoing crisis in Haiti is already destabilizing the Caribbean.
Q: How could different political outcomes in Venezuela affect regional migration patterns?
MONTOYA Different political outcomes in Venezuela will shape migration in ways that directly affect security and stability across the hemisphere. A poorly planned or executed transition is likely to sustain displacement, increasing pressure on neighboring countries. By contrast, a coherent, gradual transition could restore confidence and reduce outward migration, particularly if basic needs and security concerns are addressed. For this reason, incorporating the perspectives of Venezuelans most affected by the crisis is essential to easing migration pressures and preventing further instability.
JONES If Venezuela experiences even modest stabilization through improved governance, economic management, or security, then outward migration could slow. Large-scale return migration is unlikely in the near term. Conversely, prolonged uncertainty or institutional breakdown would likely sustain or renew migration flows, particularly toward Colombia, Brazil, Peru, and the Caribbean. Over time, the challenge for the region is shifting from emergency response to long-term integration (PDF); millions of Venezuelans have already established durable economic and social ties outside their country.
PIAZZA If Venezuela’s dictatorship further consolidates or the country descends into deeper chaos, migration would likely intensify as people flee deteriorating conditions, with fewer targeting the United States than in the past because of the current restrictive U.S. immigration climate. Conversely, a democratic transition marked by greater stability and economic recovery would likely slow outward migration and encourage more Venezuelans to remain or even return home. (Roughly 8 million have left in recent years.)
Q: U.S. leaders have said that Venezuela’s vast oil reserves were a key driver behind last month’s operation. What might need to happen on the ground in Venezuela to move the needle for U.S. energy security?
JONES Venezuela’s oil potential is constrained less by geology than by governance. Meaningful contributions to global or U.S. energy markets would require political stability, clear legal frameworks, professional management of the oil sector, and substantial reinvestment in infrastructure. Production capacity deteriorated under Maduro and cannot be restored quickly. Even under favorable conditions, recovery would likely take several years and depend on market access, technical expertise, and confidence that the rules governing contracts and revenues will remain stable.
Q: The U.S.-Venezuela relationship is critical to shaping the post-Maduro transition. What exactly is the nature of this relationship now? Or is it still coming into focus?
MONTOYA The U.S.-Venezuela relationship is still delicately evolving. While U.S. actions have shaped the immediate post-Maduro environment and early rhetoric was inconsistent, the United States has clarified that its role is intended to be temporary and focused on stabilization rather than long-term governance. How the relationship evolves will depend on the consistency of U.S. policy, the direction of Venezuela’s political transition, the role of regional partners, and the will of the Venezuelan people, with direct implications for regional and hemispheric security.
PIAZZA The U.S.-Venezuela relationship is evolving. The Rodríguez administration appears intent on balancing its hold in Venezuela while attempting to meet the demands of the Trump administration.
This tension is particularly evident in the issue of prisoner releases. While many political prisoners have been freed, they are under strict conditions of silence, even as many others remain or are newly imprisoned.
In recent days, these strains seem to have intensified. Early signs of cooperation between the Rodríguez and Trump administrations are giving way to growing friction. Should Venezuela’s interim leadership deviate from U.S. expectations, the possibility of new military action against the country cannot be ruled out.
Q: What indicators should policymakers watch to assess Venezuela’s trajectory moving forward?
MONTOYA Policymakers should look beyond rhetoric and focus on actions. Internally, this means watching whether the interim government can stabilize the country, take credible steps toward inclusive governance, improve cost-of-living conditions, and demonstrate a real commitment to human rights. Migration trends—whether Venezuelans continue to leave or feel confident enough to return—will be an important indicator of progress or continued distress. Externally, who Venezuela partners with, and how, will shape its strategic direction and influence broader regional stability.
JONESKey indicators include changes in the independence and behavior of electoral and judicial institutions, shifts in elite alliances with security forces, and decisions about economic governance and public finance. Trends in civic space, media freedom, and repression are also critical. On the economic side, transparency in the oil sector and social service delivery will matter. These indicators should provide a clearer picture over time of whether Venezuela is moving toward stabilization, stagnation, or renewed crisis.
