{"id":9669,"date":"2026-02-05T13:21:27","date_gmt":"2026-02-05T18:21:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/?p=9669"},"modified":"2026-02-05T13:21:27","modified_gmt":"2026-02-05T18:21:27","slug":"guatemalas-new-state-of-emergency-isnt-just-about-gangs","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/?p=9669","title":{"rendered":"Guatemala\u2019s New State of Emergency Isn\u2019t Just About Gangs"},"content":{"rendered":"
Relatives of a slain policeman mourn as officers carry his coffin during a funeral ceremony at the Interior Ministry headquarters in Guatemala City on January 19, 2026. Guatemala’s president on January 18 declared a 30-day nationwide state of emergency to combat criminal gangs after authorities accused the groups of killing eight police officers and holding hostages at three prisons. The killings occurred in the Guatemalan capital and surrounding areas a day after gang-affiliated inmates took 46 people hostage in the three prisons across the country to demand incarcerated gang leaders be moved to lower-security facilities. (Photo by JOHAN ORDONEZ \/ AFP via Getty Images)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

President Bernardo Ar\u00e9valo announced a 30-day \u201cstate of siege\u201d in Guatemala on Jan. 19 that was quickly approved by the Congress. The emergency measure restricts some civil liberties and allows security forces to detain people without warrants. While the move on the surface looks similar to longstanding states of emergency in El Salvador<\/a> and Honduras<\/a>, the underlying dynamics and potential outcomes differ. Unlike in El Salvador, where the ongoing \u201cstate of exception\u201d since March 2022 has allowed President Nayib Bukele to consolidate his authoritarian regime, in Guatemala it seems to be part of a struggle by Ar\u00e9valo and aligned democratic forces to finally move forward on reform of the justice system, as opponents seek to secure their continuing control over these institutions.<\/p>\n

As in El Salvador, the immediate trigger was a spate of prison riots and assassinations carried out by street gangs. In the case of Guatemala, imprisoned leaders of the Barrio 18 gang asked for improved prison conditions<\/a> (including air conditioning and king-sized beds).  When they were (unsurprisingly) denied, they provoked uprisings and took hostages in three prisons. As these were contained, they unleashed, via their cohorts outside, a wave of assassinations of police officers<\/a>, leaving 10 dead. Also as in El Salvador, the public overwhelmingly supports the president\u2019s drastic action against the Barrio 18 and Mara Salvatrucha gangs, who extort and threaten people and control local illicit markets. During the past year, the government has stepped up anti-gang measures, including limiting the use of phones by gang leaders behind bars, declaring the gangs terrorist organizations, and building or refurbishing new maximum-security prisons. In December, the interior minister resigned<\/a> after a prison breakout went unnoticed for weeks.<\/p>\n

In a speech announcing the state of siege, Ar\u00e9valo accused<\/a> \u201cpolitical-criminal mafias\u201d of being behind the riots and attacks on police. \u201cThe towers (\u201ctorres\u201d in Spanish) of corruption and impunity that for decades have sustained the destabilizing structures that are behind [these events] are coming down,\u201d Ar\u00e9valo declared. In case anyone missed the reference, Sandra Torres, a former first lady who was his opponent in the August 2023 elections responded<\/a> as though she had been personally attacked, denouncing his \u201cinsinuations.\u201d Torres has long been accused of being a lynchpin in the \u201cpact of the corrupt,\u201d<\/a> a group of economic elites allied with organized crime elements and predatory military and government officials who have captured several State institutions and functions, and many of whom have been sanctioned<\/a> by the United States<\/a>. She led efforts to annul Ar\u00e9valo\u2019s election. Torres\u2019 niece is the romantic partner of \u201cEl Lobo,\u201d the Barrio 18 leader who set off the prison takeovers, though Torres insists that she hasn\u2019t seen them in years.<\/p>\n

In his announcement of the state of siege, Ar\u00e9valo also noted the timing of the gangs\u2019 attacks \u201cjust when the country is advancing to free its institutions from the criminal networks that traffic in corruption and impunity,\u201d especially its justice system. Indeed, this seems to be the underlying logic of the attacks: whenever the pact of the corrupt wants to send a warning to those trying to shut it down, prison-based gangs mobilize to send the message. This time, the apparent mobilization coincides with the beginning of a crucial few months in which Guatemala engages in selection processes that will either overhaul its justice and electoral institutions or demonstrate to the population that electing a reformer in 2023 was a waste of time. It\u2019s a warning.<\/p>\n

Influencing Selection Processes?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Ar\u00e9valo came into office in January 2024 promising to get rid of corrupt prosecutors and judges. But he has been unwilling to test his legal ability to do so by firing the attorney general, and \u2014 unlike Bukele next door \u2013his party does not control Congress or the higher courts. Given these unfavorable conditions, Ar\u00e9valo has chosen caution, hobbling his reform agenda and putting him on the defensive. His support has sagged<\/a> accordingly.<\/p>\n

Between now and mid-year, several fraught selection processes will take place. The one that has drawn the most attention is that of attorney general, a position held since 2018 by Consuelo Porras. A nominating committee approved by Congress is to rank applicants and decide on six finalists for a new six-year term, one of whom is to be chosen by the president and take office in May. Porras, sanctioned<\/a> by the United States and Europe for corruption and undemocratic actions, has been the point person<\/a> for the pact of the corrupt in efforts to undermine Ar\u00e9valo and his potential reforms. She has investigated, arrested, and jailed journalists<\/a>, Ar\u00e9valo\u2019s political party, anyone associated with the now-defunct Commission Against Impunity<\/a>, and indigenous leaders<\/a> who led the 2023 protests that put Ar\u00e9valo into office. At the same time, she has refused to investigate<\/a> well-documented corruption and organized crime cases. She and her backers  can be expected to pressure<\/a> the newly-installed nominating committee to include only their preferred candidates in the list, leaving Ar\u00e9valo with only bad options.<\/p>\n

Selection processes also are underway for the 10 (5 + 5 alternate) judges of the Constitutional Court. In this process, the executive branch, the Supreme Court, the country\u2019s Congress (a unicameral legislature), the Bar Association, and the governing council of the public university each choose one judge. In the last election, a progressive judge was chosen by the university the legislature barred<\/a> her from assuming her seat. There are no hearings and no opportunities for public input. And there are already efforts<\/a> to oust the pro-democracy Bar Association slate.<\/p>\n

Finally, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (a specialized elections body of judges) is the subject of yet another nominating committee, this one to send 20 names to Congress, which chooses five judges and five alternates. Those judges will play a key role in registering political parties and candidates \u2014 a continuing source of contention related to the 2023 elections \u2014 and administering the 2027 elections.<\/p>\n

Ironically, multistakeholder nominating commissions such as those above were instituted as a way to democratize selection processes, but have themselves become<\/a> subject to political pressure, influence peddling, patronage politics, and opaque dealings. Part of the problem stems from the major role played by universities and law schools: in the Electoral Commission elections, the head of the national university chairs the nominating committee and other deans are members, while in the attorney general nominating committee each of 12 law schools has a member. Predictably, new law schools (some awarding few or no degrees) sprang up<\/a>. The current public university head, also sanctioned<\/a> by the United States as corrupt, took office in 2022 after an election widely decried as fraudulent<\/a> because only his supporters were allowed to vote. In other words, university authorities are now as likely to be appointed due to their nominating function as their academic merits.  The head of the national university is also up for election this year, by yet another committee representing a combination of university administrators  and professional associations.<\/p>\n

Crisis = Opportunity?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Ar\u00e9valo should not let a good crisis go to waste. The broad societal and congressional consensus to subdue the gangs will dissipate if Ar\u00e9valo just goes after street-level gangbangers (who are easily replaceable). Rather, he needs to keep putting the corrupt networks allied with the gangs on the defensive, as he started to do with his above-quoted public remarks when imposing the state of siege. He has also finally taken the offensive in court, suing Porras\u2019 deputy prosecutor<\/a> as a private citizen for abuse of authority and obstruction of justice in a case involving publication of secret investigative files, and complaining<\/a> that Porras\u2019 office failed to charge murder against gang members arrested in relation to killing the police officers despite ample evidence. Connecting the gangs to the organized crime and corruption rings behind them may finally allow the Ar\u00e9valo government to mount an anti-gang crusade that can sweep some of these rings out of ministries and prison administration where they have become entrenched.<\/p>\n

International actors, including the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Independence of Judges and Lawyers<\/a> and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights<\/a>, have provided detailed recommendations for the selection and actions of the nominating commissions, including greater transparency, clear criteria (including lack of ties to corrupt actors), and the opportunity for public observation and input. These measures should include the security of candidates and members of nominating committees, especially pro-reform ones, and access for national and international observers.<\/p>\n

Ar\u00e9valo may try to extend the state of siege beyond 30 days, but he is unlikely to get the indefinite extensions of the Bukele-controlled Salvadoran legislature. He is also unlikely to impose Bukele\u2019s draconian regime, although he will certainly tighten inmate communications and security in the new maximum-security facilities coming online.<\/p>\n

For now, he has a short window of opportunity to use what is essentially a gang crackdown to crack open the structures of impunity.<\/p>\n

– Naomi Roht-Arriaza<\/a>, Published courtesy of Just Security.<\/a> <\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

President Bernardo Ar\u00e9valo announced a 30-day \u201cstate of siege\u201d in Guatemala on Jan. 19 that was quickly approved by the Congress. The emergency measure restricts some civil liberties and allows security forces to detain people without warrants. While the move on the surface looks similar to longstanding states of emergency in El Salvador and Honduras, the underlying dynamics…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":124,"featured_media":9670,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"fifu_image_url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.justsecurity.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/Guatemala-state-of-siege.jpg?w=1920&ssl=1","fifu_image_alt":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[182],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-9669","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-security-public-safety"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9669","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/124"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=9669"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9669\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":9671,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9669\/revisions\/9671"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/9670"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=9669"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=9669"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=9669"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}