{"id":8855,"date":"2024-09-10T00:02:37","date_gmt":"2024-09-10T04:02:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/?p=8855"},"modified":"2024-09-10T00:02:37","modified_gmt":"2024-09-10T04:02:37","slug":"what-remains-of-operation-car-wash-brazils-historic-anti-corruption-probe","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/?p=8855","title":{"rendered":"What Remains of \u2018Operation Car Wash\u2019, Brazil\u2019s Historic Anti-Corruption Probe?"},"content":{"rendered":"
Thousands of people gathered in Sao Paulo, Brazil, for an anti-government rally in March 2015. Sebasti\u00e3o Moreira \/ EPA<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Ten years ago, in March 2014, prosecutors in the Brazilian city of Curitiba transformed a money laundering investigation into a historic anti-corruption probe known as Opera\u00e7\u00e3o Lava Jato<\/em> (Operation Car Wash<\/a>). The probe uncovered evidence of corruption involving some of Brazil\u2019s largest companies and most powerful politicians.<\/p>\n

The revelations had dramatic political consequences. They led to massive street protests, tipped the Brazilian economy into a full-fledged depression<\/a>, and provided the background for the impeachment<\/a> of the country\u2019s president, Dilma Rousseff, in 2016.<\/p>\n

Lava Jato<\/em> also resulted in the conviction<\/a> and imprisonment of Rousseff\u2019s predecessor (and Brazil\u2019s current president), Luiz In\u00e1cio Lula da Silva, in 2017. Lula, who spent 580 days in jail, was undoubtedly the most famous of all the Lava Jato<\/em> defendants.<\/p>\n

Lula and Rousseff\u2019s centre-left Workers\u2019 party (PT) remained in the spotlight for a long period of time. But the scandals involved politicians from across the political spectrum. The two other main parties at the time, the centrist Democratic Brazilian Movement and the centre-right Brazilian Social Democracy party, have also been severely affected.<\/p>\n

To start with, both parties were in support of Lava Jato<\/em>. However, many of their leaders were implicated too, which undermined their ability to capitalise on the PT\u2019s fall from grace. They have each seen their representation in Congress diminish<\/a> by much more than the PT.<\/p>\n

The investigations spurred a wave of anti-establishment sentiment<\/a> that propelled far-right politician Jair Bolsonaro<\/a> to the presidency in 2018 on an anti-corruption mandate. You can find out more on the details of Lava Jato<\/em> in a longer version<\/a> of this story we wrote in ECO<\/a>, an Italian magazine (which is also available in English).<\/p>\n

Several of the companies and individuals implicated by Lava Jato<\/em> for siphoning funds from state-owned companies and from public coffers agreed to pay<\/a> billions of euros in fines. But most of the penalties, convictions and agreements resulting from the probe have now been \u2013 or are at risk of being \u2013 overturned.<\/p>\n

This includes the leniency agreement<\/a> signed by the construction giant Odebrecht and Brazil\u2019s public prosecutor office in late 2016. The agreement, which involved a heavy fine and various depositions about decades of the company\u2019s wrongdoing, implicated 98 politicians, including eight ministers in the government of Rousseff\u2019s successor, Michel Temer. It also exposed the involvement of 39 sitting federal deputies and 24 senators, spanning 15 different political parties.<\/p>\n

The \u201cend-of-the-world plea deal\u201d signed by Odebrecht, as it came to be known<\/a>, appears to have fallen short of its promises. So, what do these reversals reveal about the capacity of Brazil\u2019s institutions to control corruption?<\/p>\n

Malfeasance continued to thrive<\/strong><\/p>\n

Lava Jato<\/em> became associated with overreach by the prosecutors and judges who handled the cases. They aggressively used plea bargain agreements, pretrial detentions and police raids, while also leaking testimony and documents to the press. Their actions over time came to be perceived as excessive and biased<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The probe itself was also not free from scandal. Sergio Moro, a judge who played a significant role in the conviction of Lula, was appointed<\/a> minister of justice in Bolsonaro\u2019s government in November 2018.<\/p>\n

In a turn of events worthy of a Netflix script, hacked messages<\/a> dating back to the minister\u2019s time as a judge revealed Moro and prosecutors coordinating some of their moves. Other revelations cast doubt on their management of the resources recovered by the Brazilian state.<\/p>\n

Congressional leadership and a \u201cbacklash\u201d coalition across parties \u2013 ranging from the PT to Bolsonaro\u2019s Liberal party \u2013 then orchestrated a rollback<\/a> of some of the most significant components of Brazil\u2019s anti-corruption framework.<\/p>\n

In 2019, for example, stricter sanctions<\/a> were introduced for prosecutors and judges who overstep their functions. And, two years later, a nearly unanimous vote significantly reduced the scope<\/a> of the administrative improbity law that had been the grounds for many of Lava Jato\u2019s<\/em> attempts at reimbursing public coffers.<\/p>\n

There is also a discussion currently ongoing<\/a> in Congress regarding the reversal of plea bargain laws. This instrument was frequently used not only by Lava Jato<\/em> but also in investigations into Bolsonaro\u2019s involvement in numerous irregularities<\/a> during his term in office. These range from an attempt at a coup d’\u00e9tat<\/a> in 2023 to corruption.<\/p>\n

Under Bolsonaro, Congress asserted greater control over the federal budget. Individual lawmakers were allowed to direct money to their chosen beneficiaries through a fund known as the \u201csecret budget\u201d<\/a> due to its lack of transparency. Critics argue that the transfers opened the door to corrupt deals.<\/p>\n

The once strong anti-corruption stance of the country\u2019s highest courts has also changed and many of their justices have reversed prior decisions. This has involved strategic compromises<\/a> with Congress that helped the higher courts fend off offensive moves by Bolsonaro\u2019s government on the court and its justices.<\/p>\n

People often assume that prosecutions and convictions<\/a> deter elected officials from engaging in corruption, as they witness the damaged reputations and fates of their colleagues.<\/p>\n

But, in addition to Lava Jato\u2019s<\/em> own failures, the reversal of the penalties and convictions in Brazil show how hard it is to punish corruption when a large chunk of the economic and political elite benefits from it. To a significant extent, Lava Jato\u2019s<\/em> grandiose ambitions inadvertently invited such blowback<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Bolsonaro proudly declared the end<\/a> of Lava Jato<\/em> in 2020, asserting that his government was free of corruption. However, malfeasance continued to thrive. After a decade it seems clear that the historic anti-corruption probe did not foster a reformist elite with a clear plan to strengthen Brazil\u2019s democratic institutions and the rule of law.<\/p>\n

The threats to democracy we have seen since, and the fact that corruption control is weaker now than it was before the investigations began, are together a good case in point.<\/p>\n

Manoel Gehrke<\/a>, Research Fellow with the Centre for Elections, Democracy, Accountability and Representation, University of Birmingham<\/a><\/em> and Luciano Da Ros<\/a>, Assistant Professor, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n

This article is republished from The Conversation<\/a> under a Creative Commons license.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Ten years ago, in March 2014, prosecutors in the Brazilian city of Curitiba transformed a money laundering investigation into a historic anti-corruption probe known as Opera\u00e7\u00e3o Lava Jato (Operation Car Wash). The probe uncovered evidence of corruption involving some of Brazil\u2019s largest companies and most powerful politicians. The revelations had dramatic political consequences. They led…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":124,"featured_media":8856,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"fifu_image_url":"https:\/\/images.theconversation.com\/files\/613587\/original\/file-20240814-17-t7iat0.jpg?ixlib=rb-4.1.0&rect=44%2C696%2C5000%2C2500&q=45&auto=format&w=1356&h=668&fit=crop","fifu_image_alt":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[192],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-8855","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-polity-governance"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8855","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/124"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=8855"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8855\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":8857,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8855\/revisions\/8857"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/8856"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=8855"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=8855"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=8855"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}