{"id":6972,"date":"2019-10-11T09:36:33","date_gmt":"2019-10-11T13:36:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/?p=6972"},"modified":"2019-10-11T09:36:33","modified_gmt":"2019-10-11T13:36:33","slug":"the-latin-american-left-isnt-dead-yet","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/?p=6972","title":{"rendered":"The Latin American Left Isn\u2019t Dead Yet"},"content":{"rendered":"
Many of Latin America\u2019s leftist \u2018revolutions\u2019 are now in crisis. But the left is resurging in some countries. The Conversation \/ Photo Claudia Daut\/Reuters<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Argentina, Bolivia and Uruguay<\/a> will all hold presidential elections in October. And, for now, leftists are strong contenders<\/a> in all three countries.<\/p>\n

This is a somewhat unexpected development. Beginning in 2015, conservatives toppled<\/a> major leftist strongholds, including in Brazil, Argentina and Chile. The socially progressive Latin American left was declared dead<\/a> many times over<\/a>.<\/p>\n

But the left-leaning populist Andr\u00e9s Manuel L\u00f3pez Obrador\u2019s victory in Mexico<\/a> in July 2018 showed that Latin American political winds don\u2019t all blow in the same direction<\/a>.<\/p>\n

So what can be learned from the failures and successes of Latin America\u2019s leftist parties and governments in the very recent past?<\/p>\n

Latin America\u2019s \u2018left turn\u2019<\/strong><\/p>\n

About two-thirds of all Latin Americans lived under some form of leftist government by 2010<\/a> \u2013 a \u201cpink tide\u201d that washed over the region following the election of Hugo Ch\u00e1vez in Venezuela in 1998.<\/p>\n

Only a few countries \u2013 notably Colombia and Mexico \u2013 remained under conservative political leadership during this period.<\/p>\n

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Argentina, Bolivia and Uruguay have elections in October. Shutterstock.com\/The Conversation<\/figcaption><\/figure>
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Academics conventionally grouped this Latin American left<\/a> into two camps<\/a>.<\/p>\n

There was the moderate \u201csocial democratic\u201d left of Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, which embraced an agenda of egalitarianism while accepting the basic precepts of market economics.<\/p>\n

This group was generally contrasted with the more radical \u201cpopulist\u201d left<\/a> that ran Venezuela, Bolivia<\/a>, Nicaragua and Ecuador. These governments shared the moderate left\u2019s commitment to progressive social change but had bolder aims: an alternative to market economics and profound changes to political institutions.<\/p>\n

Such groupings did little to predict these countries\u2019 divergent fates.<\/p>\n

In a few places, leftist governments have remained popular, vibrant and electorally competitive after over a decade in power \u2013 namely Bolivia and Uruguay<\/a>.<\/p>\n

But by 2015, Brazil<\/a>, Venezuela<\/a> and Nicaragua<\/a> had all become political and economic catastrophes. Chile\u2019s leftist government<\/a> sharply declined in popularity.<\/p>\n

The conformist temptation<\/strong><\/p>\n

Our political science research<\/a> identifies some shared weaknesses of the Latin American left<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The first lesson comes from the Workers Party, which governed Brazil between 2003 and 2016.<\/p>\n

Like many progressive parties, the Workers Party\u2019s founding leaders were idealistic \u2013 committed to upending Brazilian politics as usual<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Under the Workers Party, Brazil experienced a massive expansion of social citizenship rights<\/a>. By 2008, Brazilian President Lula da Silva was arguably the world\u2019s most popular president<\/a>.<\/p>\n

But the Workers Party became detached from the social movements<\/a> it once championed. Deeply immersed in the normal \u2013 even corrupt<\/a> \u2013 give-and-take of Brazilian politics, the party came to be molded by the flawed system it sought to change.<\/p>\n

We call this pitfall the \u201cconformist temptation.\u201d<\/p>\n

The Workers Party rule ended with the 2016 impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff<\/a>, Lula\u2019s hand-picked successor. Although Rousseff herself faced no corruption charges<\/a>, the Workers Party left power associated with corruption scandals, campaign finance violations and economic mismanagement \u2013 the exact problems it had promised to fix.<\/p>\n

Chile\u2019s Socialist Party met a similar fate.<\/p>\n

Under Presidents Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet, moderate leftists who governed Chile almost uninterrupted from 2001 to 2018, the party distanced itself from its supporters in social movements<\/a>.<\/p>\n

In 2011, students and teachers began protesting<\/a> Chile\u2019s low levels of public education funding and high inequality<\/a>. The youth protest movement<\/a> grew, exposing Chileans\u2019 disappointment at the Socialists\u2019 limited progress on social reforms.<\/p>\n

These divisions on the left allowed Chile\u2019s strong right wing to win<\/a> Chile\u2019s 2018 presidential election.<\/p>\n

The autocratic temptation<\/strong><\/p>\n

Crises in Venezuela, Nicaragua and Ecuador result from a different fatal flaw.<\/p>\n

In these three countries, leftist leaders succumbed to what we call the \u201cautocratic temptation\u201d \u2013 the idea that a charismatic leader or popular political movement not only can speak for an entire nation<\/a> but that they can do so forever<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Like many authoritarian leaders, Venezuela\u2019s Nicol\u00e1s Maduro and Nicaragua\u2019s Daniel Ortega have lost touch with their constituents. When leaders become too insulated, research shows<\/a>, safeguards against corruption and irresponsible public policies weaken.<\/p>\n

Authoritarian leaders are less likely to change course when things go wrong.<\/p>\n

The consequences may be devastating \u2013 like Maduro\u2019s egregious failure to adjust Venezuela\u2019s exchange rate policies during its descent into economic crisis and hyperinflation<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Authoritarian leadership<\/a> has degraded democracy in Venezuela, Nicaragua and Ecuador in other ways, too. Checks and balances on presidential authority<\/a> have been weakened and press freedoms restricted. In Venezuela and Nicaragua, the electoral process was manipulated<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The autocratic temptation to lionize a charismatic founding leader weakens the governing political party, too, by making it extremely difficult for new leaders to emerge and carry forward the party\u2019s long-term transformative agenda.<\/p>\n

In Nicaragua and Venezuela, that has meant that autocrats have clung to power<\/a> despite popular demand that they leave.<\/p>\n

In Ecuador<\/a>, the current and former presidents \u2013 Len\u00edn Moreno and Rafael Correa \u2013 are engaged in a bitter dispute. Protests have rocked Ecuador over Moreno\u2019s economic policy shifts<\/a> away from Correa\u2019s agenda.<\/p>\n

Leftist exceptions<\/strong><\/p>\n

So what explains the resilience of the left in Bolivia<\/a> and Uruguay<\/a>, where leftist parties have reduced inequality<\/a> and made tremendous progress toward social and political inclusion<\/a>? Left-wing candidates are polling well in both countries\u2019 presidential races<\/a>.<\/p>\n

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Argentine presidential candidate Alberto Fernandez and running mate, former President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, at a campaign rally, Aug. 7, 2019. Reuters\/Agustin Marcarian<\/figcaption><\/figure><\/figure>\n

In our assessment, what sets Bolivia and Uruguay apart is the strength of the ties between the leftist parties and allied social movements<\/a> there. That has encouraged the accountability and responsiveness lacking in Venezuela, Brazil and Chile.<\/p>\n

Civil society in Bolivia and Uruguay also retained its capacity for independent mobilization, constraining any possible slide into autocracy or unbridled ambition.<\/p>\n

That may explain why Bolivia has so far avoided the worst social and economic consequences of the autocratic temptation<\/a> \u2013 despite its charismatic indigenous president, Evo Morales, eliminating term limits and consolidating power<\/a> over the past 14 years.<\/p>\n

In Argentina the left\u2019s possible comeback has more to do with conservative president Mauricio Macri\u2019s economic mismanagement<\/a>. But the center-left ticket leading Argentina\u2019s presidential race has also succeeded because the candidates formed a broad national coalition \u2013 one that includes an array of social movements, from labor unions to feminist groups.<\/p>\n

The Latin American left has some life in it yet.<\/p>\n

Santiago Anria<\/a>, Assistant Professor of Political Science and Latin American Studies, Dickinson College<\/a><\/em> and Kenneth M. Roberts<\/a>, Richard J. Schwartz Professor of Government and Director, Latin American Studies Program, Cornell University<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n

This article is republished from The Conversation<\/a> under a Creative Commons license.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Argentina, Bolivia and Uruguay will all hold presidential elections in October. And, for now, leftists are strong contenders in all three countries. This is a somewhat unexpected development. Beginning in 2015, conservatives toppled major leftist strongholds, including in Brazil, Argentina and Chile. The socially progressive Latin American left was declared dead many times over. But…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":124,"featured_media":7336,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"fifu_image_url":"https:\/\/images.theconversation.com\/files\/296053\/original\/file-20191008-128648-1qq10yu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C46%2C2200%2C1100&q=45&auto=format&w=1356&h=668&fit=crop","fifu_image_alt":"The Latin American Left Isn\u2019t Dead Yet","footnotes":""},"categories":[192],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6972","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-polity-governance"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6972","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/124"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=6972"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6972\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6974,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6972\/revisions\/6974"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/7336"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=6972"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=6972"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=6972"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}