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The U.S. has announced<\/a> an economic embargo on Venezuela, intended to put an end to President Nicol\u00e1s Maduro\u2019s authoritarian regime.<\/p>\n In an Aug. 5 executive order<\/a>, President Donald Trump said that the tough new sanctions \u2013 which target any company or individual outside of Venezuela doing business directly or indirectly with Maduro\u2019s government \u2013 were a response to the Maduro regime\u2019s \u201ccontinued usurpation of power\u201d and \u201chuman rights abuses.\u201d<\/p>\n All Venezuelan government assets in the United States are also now frozen.<\/p>\n The new measures represent a significant escalation from previous sanctions<\/a>, which mainly targeted government officials and some key industries such as oil and gas, gold and finance.<\/p>\n But my analysis of Venezuela\u2019s political and economic crisis<\/a> suggests that an embargo alone will not provoke Maduro\u2019s ouster. Here are five reasons why.<\/p>\n 1. Venezuela\u2019s economy is already broken<\/strong><\/p>\n Embargos are a foreign policy tool<\/a> meant to pressure rogue governments into changing their ways by cutting off their cash flow.<\/p>\n It\u2019s too late for that in Venezuela.<\/p>\n After years of mismanagement and corruption by the Maduro government, Venezuela\u2019s economy is in shambles<\/a>. The GDP has contracted by more than 15% every year since 2016<\/a>. Hyperinflation hit 10 million percent<\/a> in 2019.<\/p>\n Maduro\u2019s cash-strapped government defaulted on its dollar-based bonds<\/a> in 2017. This year it has failed to make payments on US$1.85 billion<\/a> that Deutsche Bank and Citigroup loaned Venezuela using the regime\u2019s gold as collateral. Venezuela\u2019s government is nearly bankrupt.<\/p>\n But since this economic decline has happened gradually, beginning in 2014, wealthy Venezuelans \u2013 especially corrupt government officials \u2013 have already put their money overseas<\/a>, primarily in European markets. For example, Venezuelans own some 7,000 luxury apartments<\/a> in Madrid, according to The New York Times.<\/p>\n American sanctions just can\u2019t hurt Venezuela\u2019s ruling class the way they might have several years ago.<\/p>\n 2. The embargo leaves some cash flows untouched<\/strong><\/p>\n Trump\u2019s harsh new sanctions on Venezuela are not a full trade embargo like the Cuba embargo, which has almost totally isolated the island from world markets since 1962<\/a>.<\/p>\n Imports and exports with the private sector \u2013 a still sizable market<\/a> despite Maduro\u2019s socialist policies \u2013 will continue to flow freely, as will remittances from Venezuelans living abroad.<\/p>\n These two income sources both come in dollars, which is far more stable and valuable than the local currency. Combined, they can keep the ailing Venezuelan economy afloat for some time.<\/p>\n An incomplete embargo, in other words, will not provoke complete economic collapse.<\/p>\n 3. The poor, not the regime, will be hurt the most<\/strong><\/p>\n Venezuelans with access to dollars<\/a> \u2013 through remittances or savings squirreled away before the crisis \u2013 are surviving this crisis. They can afford food, medicine and gasoline, and buy other goods to barter.<\/p>\n But most Venezuelans today are desperately poor. According to the United Nations, 90% of people there live in poverty<\/a>. That\u2019s double what it was in 2014.<\/p>\n The Venezuelan minimum wage of roughly $7 per month is not enough to cover a family\u2019s basic needs. As a result, malnutrition is spreading. Last year, Venezuelans reported losing an average of 25 pounds<\/a>, and two-thirds said they go to bed hungry<\/a>.<\/p>\n The majority of Venezuelans rely on the government to eat. Its monthly delivery of heavily subsidized food and basic goods<\/a> known as \u201cCLAP\u201d is a lifeline to the poor. If the government runs out of money, poor people will feel it the most \u2013 not the government officials and other Venezuelans with access to dollars<\/a>.<\/p>\n 4. China and Russia still support Venezuela<\/strong><\/p>\n Maduro has few international allies. When the Trump administration led efforts earlier this year to recognize opposition leader Juan Guaid\u00f3 as the legitimate president of Venezuela<\/a>, 60 countries joined it.<\/p>\n But China and Russia continue to be the Venezuela\u2019s most powerful international boosters and have bailed out Maduro by giving his government massive loans<\/a> in the past. Both have vetoed every U.S. effort to pass resolutions against Maduro\u2019s government<\/a> within the United Nations.<\/p>\n China has exploited Venezuela\u2019s vast natural resources<\/a> for profit. Russia has made the South American nation a strategic geopolitical partner in the Western Hemisphere, a key ally in its efforts to undermine American influence<\/a>.<\/p>\n Neither of the two countries are likely to comply with an economic embargo to Venezuela. Analysts expect them to continue buying oil, gold<\/a> and other valuable commodities from Maduro\u2019s regime, providing much-needed cash to his government.<\/p>\n 5. Remember Cuba?<\/strong><\/p>\n Embargoes rarely produce regime change of the sort Trump seeks in Venezuela.<\/p>\n Just consider Cuba, which this year celebrated the 66th anniversary of its communist revolution \u2013 57 years after the Kennedy government imposed a trade embargo against it<\/a>. The Cuba embargo didn\u2019t end the Castro regime; it fueled anti-American sentiment, handing the Castros an easy scapegoat for all the country\u2019s problems \u2013 thereby improving the government\u2019s own popularity<\/a>.<\/p>\n An embargo will almost surely do the same in Venezuela. Trump has given Maduro even more ammunition to blame the U.S.<\/a> for his country\u2019s economic woes.<\/p>\n Maduro has been doing that for years<\/a> anyway. Now, he won\u2019t be totally wrong. Marco Aponte-Moreno<\/a>, Associate Professor of Global Business and Board Member of the Institute for Latino and Latin American Studies, St Mary’s College of California <\/a><\/em><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/images.theconversation.com\/files\/287182\/original\/file-20190807-144878-1a84vcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip\")
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