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Venezuela finds itself with two presidents engaged in a high-stakes game to control the country\u2019s future. The country has also had two \u201cnational assemblies\u201d and many questions about how the constitution should be applied. So, how did it find itself in this position?<\/p>\n
President Nicol\u00e1s Maduro claims<\/a> to be Venezuela\u2019s constitutional president because he won the presidential election in July 2018<\/a>.<\/p>\n On January 23 2019, Juan Guaid\u00f3, one month after becoming president of Venezuela\u2019s National Assembly, disputed Maduro\u2019s legitimacy and declared the presidency vacant. He then took an oath to serve as the interim president of Venezuela.<\/p>\n Guaid\u00f3 v Maduro<\/strong><\/p>\n Although involved in politics since 2009, Guaid\u00f3 was until recently little known outside political circles. A member of the Voluntad Popular (\u201cPopular Will\u201d) party, he was an understudy to Leopoldo L\u00f3pez<\/a>, the party\u2019s leader who is currently imprisoned<\/a> for allegedly encouraging violent protests seeking the ousting of Maduro.<\/p>\n The 1999 Bolivarian Constitution<\/a>, written in the first year of the administration of former president Hugo Ch\u00e1vez, fulfilled a promise Ch\u00e1vez made in his successful 1998 presidential campaign to replace the constitution of 1991<\/a>. Most Venezuelans had come to see the earlier constitution as a democratic fa\u00e7ade, serving the interests of a corrupt, wealthy ruling elite that controlled the only two parties with any chance of winning power through elections.<\/p>\n Maduro was Ch\u00e1vez\u2019s vice president and the clear choice to succeed Ch\u00e1vez after his death in March 2013, only five months after winning an election for a third term. Elections during the Ch\u00e1vez years were criticized by observers, such as the Carter Center<\/a>, for the government favoritism in the campaigns, but most saw the vote count as honest.<\/p>\n Ch\u00e1vez won easily due to strong support among the country\u2019s poor majority<\/a>, who benefited from social programs funded by the country\u2019s oil bounty \u2013 which, before Ch\u00e1vez, had mostly gone to the wealthy and middle class.<\/p>\n Maduro\u2019s unusual elections<\/strong><\/p>\n The Maduro era has seen more questions arise<\/a> about the fairness of campaigns, but also about official results. Despite Chavez\u2019s blessing, Maduro barely won the special election to replace the deceased leader, winning only 50.6% of the vote.<\/p>\n Maduro\u2019s political standing plunged further in mid-2014 when the price of oil, which can vary from 20 to 40% of GDP in any given year, collapsed<\/a>, falling from US$130 to US$30 per barrel in late 2015<\/a>.<\/p>\n In December 2015 Maduro\u2019s United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) suffered a severe defeat<\/a> in the National Assembly elections of December 2015. The opposition won a super majority of seats, enough to undo the programs of the Ch\u00e1vez era. Much of the opposition had participated in a failed coup<\/a> in 2002 and never accepted the 1999 constitution \u2013 but all now embraced it as a tool to try to remove Maduro.<\/p>\n They gathered enough signatures to force a recall election upon Maduro, but the PSUV used delaying tactics to ensure that an opposition win would result in the vice president taking over. The recall effort faded away<\/a>.<\/p>\n The opposition-controlled National Assembly began to act to slow or end Chavez\u2019s programs and to limit Maduro\u2019s power. The country\u2019s Supreme Court, filled with PSUV appointees, used a dispute over the election of three assembly deputies<\/a> to rule that the body was unconstitutionally abusing its power and threatened to close the unicameral Congress down.<\/p>\n A legislature stripped of its powers<\/strong><\/p>\n Maduro instead decided to convene a new National Constituent Assembly<\/a> (NCA) to rewrite the constitution and create what Ch\u00e1vez himself had called the \u201ccommunal state\u201d. This state would theoretically shift much power over policies and state spending (generated almost entirely by oil exports) to local and regional citizens\u2019 councils.<\/p>\n To do this, Maduro used a vague phrase in Article 348<\/a> of the constitution that says: \u201cThe initiative for calling a National Constituent Assembly may emanate from the President of the Republic sitting with the Cabinet of Ministers.\u201d<\/p>\n The opposition refused to participate in the election (turnout was 41%) of delegates to the NCA \u2013 as a result it is almost entirely composed of Maduro supporters. On August 8 2017 the NCA took legislative powers for itself<\/a>, away from the National Assembly, under Article 349<\/a> of the existing constitution, which is intended to avoid obstruction of a constitutional assembly\u2019s work.<\/p>\n Venezuela\u2019s electoral authorities scheduled the May 2018 presidential election half a year early. Though constitutional, the timing made it difficult for the deeply divided opposition to choose its candidate. A large faction boycotted the vote; another backed a candidate, the governor of an important state.<\/p>\n Maduro won with 67.8%. The turnout was 46.7%, low by Venezuelan standards. Maduro claims<\/a> this election makes him the legitimate president<\/a> and accuses the opposition, the United States and other foreign governments of fomenting a coup.<\/p>\n Guaid\u00f3 claims to be the constitutional interim president after the National Assembly declared the presidency to be \u201cvacant\u201d under Article 233<\/a> of the constitution, which allows for an interim president to replace a sitting president \u201cupon abandonment of his position, duly declared by the National Assembly\u201d.<\/p>\n Guaid\u00f3 defends<\/a> his action as a constitutional route out of the country\u2019s economic and political crises \u2013 and his move has been endorsed by much of the mainstream news media<\/a> in liberal democracies. Maduro has highlighted that he won an election \u2013 and Guaid\u00f3 has not. Guaid\u00f3 promised he would call elections once he has actual control of government.<\/p>\n Why did both presidents try so hard to justify their status as \u201cconstitutional\u201d when almost everyone agrees the military holds the keys to power? For one thing, many in the military feel it\u2019s their job to uphold the constitution. And both sides wanted to appeal to international public opinion.<\/p>\n Both sides wanted the support of Venezuelans in the poor urban neighborhoods and countryside, who see the 1999 constitution as guaranteeing their right, won under Chavez, to be politically included in determining the country\u2019s future. Daniel Hellinger<\/a>, Professor Emeritus of International Relations, Webster University<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n![\"The](\"https:\/\/counter.theconversation.com\/content\/111198\/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic\")
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