{"id":6521,"date":"2018-04-21T17:33:10","date_gmt":"2018-04-21T21:33:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/?p=6521"},"modified":"2018-04-21T17:33:10","modified_gmt":"2018-04-21T21:33:10","slug":"cubas-new-president-what-to-expect-of-miguel-diaz-canel","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/?p=6521","title":{"rendered":"Cuba\u2019s New President: What to Expect of Miguel D\u00edaz-Canel"},"content":{"rendered":"
Cuba\u2019s new president, at the National Assembly meeting where he was appointed to succeed Ra\u00fal Castro on April 18, 2018. Alexandre Meneghini\/Reuters<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Cuba has a new president<\/a> \u2013 and for the first time in six decades, his last name is not Castro.<\/p>\n

Cuba\u2019s National Assembly has elected Cuba\u2019s First Vice President Miguel D\u00edaz-Canel<\/a> to replace 87-year-old Ra\u00fal Castro, who took over as Cuba\u2019s leader in 2006 after his brother Fidel Castro fell ill.<\/p>\n

Ra\u00fal Castro stepped down in observance of the two-term limit for senior government and party officials<\/a> that he himself mandated in 2011. In so doing, he opened the door not just for a new president but for a generational transition in Cuba.<\/p>\n

This is one of the most important moments I\u2019ve seen in 40 years of studying and writing on Cuba<\/a>.<\/p>\n

D\u00edaz-Canel faces real challenges. Cuba\u2019s economy is weak, relations with Washington are deteriorating and internet expansion on the Communist island has produced a growing chorus of domestic critics.<\/p>\n

Who can fill Castro\u2019s shoes?<\/strong><\/p>\n

The political rise of 57-year-old D\u00edaz-Canel represents the final stage of a transfer of power away from the \u201chistoric generation\u201d that waged Cuba\u2019s 1959 revolution. The charisma of Fidel Castro, who died in 2016<\/a>, was for decades a pillar of Cuba\u2019s regime.<\/p>\n

D\u00edaz-Canel \u2013 a trained engineer who worked his way up from local party leader to first vice president \u2013 will have to earn his authority through performance.<\/p>\n

\n
\"\"
Fidel Castro in 1959. U.S. Library of Congress<\/figcaption><\/figure>
<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Those who have followed his career<\/a> say D\u00edaz-Canel is a seasoned, pragmatic politician. As a Communist official in his home province of Villa Clara in the 1990s, when Cuba suffered a prolonged economic depression<\/a>, he rode his bicycle to work rather than take a car and driver.<\/p>\n

He appears ill at ease with large audiences but relaxed and congenial in small groups \u2013 much like his mentor, Ra\u00fal Castro.<\/p>\n

As president, D\u00edaz-Canel will still benefit from Ra\u00fal Castro\u2019s experience and authority. Castro remains first secretary<\/a> of the Communist Party \u2013 Cuba\u2019s only party \u2013 until 2021.<\/p>\n

This is arguably a post more powerful than the presidency. The party leadership makes all major economic, social and foreign relations policies, which the president is obliged to carry out.<\/p>\n

So I don\u2019t expect any drastic changes in direction from D\u00edaz-Canel \u2013 at least, not right away.<\/p>\n

What\u2019s in store for Cuba<\/strong><\/p>\n

This political transition is still significant, though. For the first time, the leader of the Communist Party and the leader of the government are different people. Both Fidel and Ra\u00fal Castro held both positions simultaneously.<\/p>\n

Cuba must now sort out the lines of authority between party and state. As D\u00edaz-Canel staffs government ministries with his own team, he will gain ever more control over how policy is interpreted and implemented.<\/p>\n

He will immediately face some tough issues. Cuba\u2019s economy is struggling<\/a>, dragged down by the dual-currency system Fidel Castro adopted in 1994 to attract cash remittances from Cuban expats.<\/p>\n

Ra\u00fal Castro has declared<\/a> that currency reunification \u201ccannot be delayed any longer.\u201d But turning two currencies into one<\/a> is a tricky business with unpredictable economic consequences.<\/p>\n

D\u00edaz-Canel will also face pressure to reinvigorate the Cuban economy by pushing ahead with the controversial economic reform program<\/a> launched by Ra\u00fal Castro early in his tenure, which loosened restrictions on private enterprise and enabled foreign investment in Cuba.<\/p>\n

The pace of change has since slowed, frustrating Cubans<\/a>. If D\u00edaz-Canel opens up Cuba\u2019s economy too quickly, he\u2019ll alienate Communist Party conservatives. Going too slowly will anger reformers.<\/p>\n

\n
\"\"
Cuba has opened up to foreign investment in recent years, creating a special economic zone and building a new port in Mariel Bay. AP Photo\/Franklin Reyes,File<\/figcaption><\/figure>
<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Another contentious issue is freedom of expression. Public criticism of the Cuban regime<\/a> has grown as more citizens connect to the internet. Last year, hard-liners launched a campaign vilifying critical bloggers<\/a>, which \u2013 to many onlookers\u2019 surprise<\/a> \u2013 D\u00edaz-Canal supported<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Other prominent Cubans pushed back<\/a>, though, and the campaign ended without any of the targeted web sites being closed down.<\/p>\n

Ra\u00fal Castro has balanced conflicting factions with a delicate strategy he described as reform \u201cwithout haste, but without pause.\u201d D\u00edaz-Canel must now demonstrate he, too, can manage these conflicts.<\/p>\n

US-Cuba relations in flux<\/strong><\/p>\n

Finally, the new president has to deal with the mercurial U.S. administration. President Donald Trump has largely outsourced<\/a> Cuba policy to conservative Cuban-Americans in Congress, led by Sen. Marco Rubio, a Republican from Florida.<\/p>\n

In June 2017, Trump declared he was \u201ccancelling<\/a>\u201d some Obama-era Cuba political reforms and re-tightening parts of the economic embargo<\/a>.<\/p>\n

In October, Trump further battered bilateral ties by downsizing the American Embassy in Cuba<\/a> after U.S. government personnel suffered unexplained health problems there<\/a>. He also expelled 17 Cuban diplomats from Washington.<\/p>\n

Recent Trump appointments do not bode well for the future of U.S.-Cuban relations. The incoming secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, was a vocal opponent<\/a> of Obama\u2019s rapprochement with Havana. National security adviser John Bolton<\/a> once deemed Cuba part of an \u201caxis of evil,\u201d falsely accusing<\/a> it of developing biological weapons.<\/p>\n

Anticipation and trepidation<\/strong><\/p>\n

In December, I was in Havana, a city where the benefits of Ra\u00fal Castro\u2019s economic reforms are most tangible. Cubans I spoke with there seemed ready for younger leadership and excited about the impending power transition.<\/p>\n

But 80 percent of Cubans have always had a Castro as their president. So the anticipatory mood is leavened by trepidation: People fear that instability may accompany this major political change.<\/p>\n

\"TheIf D\u00edaz-Canel can deliver on the economy \u2013 the top priority for most Cubans<\/a> \u2013 he\u2019ll be judged a success. If not, he will face a rising tide of discontent from a population impatient for change.<\/p>\n

William M. LeoGrande, Professor of Government, American University School of Public Affairs<\/em><\/p>\n

This article was originally published on The Conversation. <\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Cuba has a new president \u2013 and for the first time in six decades, his last name is not Castro. Cuba\u2019s National Assembly has elected Cuba\u2019s First Vice President Miguel D\u00edaz-Canel to replace 87-year-old Ra\u00fal Castro, who took over as Cuba\u2019s leader in 2006 after his brother Fidel Castro fell ill. Ra\u00fal Castro stepped down…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":124,"featured_media":7229,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"fifu_image_url":"https:\/\/images.theconversation.com\/files\/215457\/original\/file-20180418-163998-w8tsqc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=926&fit=clip","fifu_image_alt":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[192],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6521","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-polity-governance"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6521","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/124"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=6521"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6521\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6523,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6521\/revisions\/6523"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/7229"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=6521"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=6521"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=6521"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}