{"id":6497,"date":"2018-04-05T11:45:00","date_gmt":"2018-04-05T15:45:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/?p=6497"},"modified":"2018-04-05T11:45:00","modified_gmt":"2018-04-05T15:45:00","slug":"cubas-new-president-what-to-expect","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/?p=6497","title":{"rendered":"Cuba\u2019s New President: What to Expect"},"content":{"rendered":"
Adios Ra\u00fal, hola Miguel. smael Francisco\/Courtesy of Cubadebate\/Handout via Reuters<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Leadership changes don\u2019t happen often in Cuba \u2013 there\u2019s been just one since 1959, in fact. That was in 2006, when President Fidel Castro fell ill and was replaced by his brother Ra\u00fal.<\/p>\n

Ra\u00fal Castro turned out to be a real agent of change. But after two terms<\/a> as president, the 86-year-old is stepping down. On April 19, the National Assembly will meet to pick Cuba\u2019s next leader.<\/p>\n

And for the first time in six decades, his last name will not be Castro.<\/p>\n

This is a momentous occasion \u2014 one of the most important I\u2019ve seen in 40 years of studying and writing on Cuba<\/a>. For any state born in revolution, the first transfer of power to a new generation is always politically risky.<\/p>\n

Ra\u00fal Castro\u2019s successor must grow Cuba\u2019s economy, contend with the United States and deal with a growing chorus of critics. And he will have to tackle these tasks while the Communist Party is still dominated by Fidel\u2019s revolutionary comrades, who have sharp disagreements on all these issues.<\/p>\n

Who can fill Castro\u2019s shoes?<\/strong><\/p>\n

The clear favorite to replace Ra\u00fal Castro is Cuba\u2019s 57-year-old First Vice President Miguel D\u00edaz-Canel<\/a>. His ascension would represent a transfer of power away from the \u201chistoric generation\u201d that waged Cuba\u2019s 1959 revolution, many of whom are now pushing 90.<\/p>\n

In 2011, Ra\u00fal Castro mandated a two-term limit for senior government and party officials<\/a>. It \u201cis never positive\u201d for the elderly to cling to power, he declared<\/a>.<\/p>\n

\n
\"\"
Fidel Castro in 1959. U.S. Library of Congress<\/figcaption><\/figure>
<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

But the charisma of Fidel Castro, who died in 2016<\/a>, has been a pillar of Cuba\u2019s regime. D\u00edaz-Canel \u2013 a trained engineer who worked his way up from provincial party leader to first vice president \u2013 will have to earn his authority through performance.<\/p>\n

Those who have followed his career<\/a> say D\u00edaz-Canel is a seasoned, pragmatic politician. He is apparently a bit stiff in front of large audiences but relaxed and congenial in small groups \u2013 much like his mentor, Ra\u00fal Castro.<\/p>\n

As president, D\u00edaz-Canel would still benefit from Castro\u2019s experience and authority. Castro remains first secretary<\/a> of the Communist Party \u2013 Cuba\u2019s only party \u2013 until 2021.<\/p>\n

This is arguably a post more powerful than the presidency. The party leadership makes all major economic, social and foreign relations policies, which the president is obliged to carry out.<\/p>\n

So I don\u2019t expect any drastic changes in direction from D\u00edaz-Canel \u2013 at least, not right away.<\/p>\n

The leadership transition is still significant, though. It marks the first time that the leader of the Communist Party and the leader of the Cuban government will be different people. Both Fidel and Ra\u00fal Castro held both positions simultaneously.<\/p>\n

Cuba must now sort out the lines of authority between party and state. As D\u00edaz-Canel staffs government ministries with his own team, he will gain ever more control over how policy is interpreted and implemented.<\/p>\n

Is Cuba in for a change?<\/strong><\/p>\n

The new president will face some tough issues.<\/p>\n

Cuba\u2019s economy is struggling<\/a>, dragged down in particular by the dual-currency system Fidel Castro adopted in 1994 to attract cash remittances from Cuban expats. Ra\u00fal Castro has declared<\/a> that currency reunification \u201ccannot be delayed any longer.\u201d<\/p>\n

But turning two currencies into one<\/a> is a tricky business with unpredictable economic consequences. And unlike almost every other country in the world, Cuba cannot turn to the International Monetary Fund or World Bank for support because it withdrew from them after the revolution<\/a>.<\/p>\n

D\u00edaz-Canel will also face pressure to reinvigorate the Cuban economy by pushing ahead with Ra\u00fal Castro\u2019s controversial economic reform program<\/a>. Castro loosened restrictions on private enterprise and foreign investment in Cuba early in his tenure, but the pace of change has since slowed.<\/p>\n

If D\u00edaz-Canel opens up Cuba\u2019s economy too quickly, he\u2019ll alienate Communist Party conservatives. Going too slowly will anger reformers, not to mention frustrate the Cuban people.<\/p>\n

Another contentious issue facing Cuba\u2019s incoming president is freedom of expression. Public criticism of the regime<\/a> has grown as more Cubans connect to the internet. Last year, hard-liners launched a campaign vilifying critical bloggers<\/a>, which \u2013 to many onlookers\u2019 surprise<\/a> \u2013 D\u00edaz-Canal supported<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Other prominent Cubans pushed back<\/a>, though, and the campaign ultimately ended without any of the targeted web sites being closed down.<\/p>\n

Castro balanced conflicting factions with a delicate strategy he described as reform \u201cwithout haste, but without pause.\u201d He also benefited from unquestioned authority in the party. D\u00edaz-Canel will have to establish his own legitimacy.<\/p>\n

US-Cuba relations in flux<\/strong><\/p>\n

Finally, D\u00edaz-Canel must deal with the mercurial Trump administration, which has largely outsourced<\/a> Cuba policy to the conservative Cuban-Americans in Congress.<\/p>\n

This faction, lead by Sen. Marco Rubio, a Republican from Florida, denounced President Barack Obama\u2019s restoration of U.S.-Cuba relations<\/a>. Although Trump declared he was \u201ccancelling\u201d<\/a> Obama\u2019s policy, he has so far left most Obama-era commercial openings untouched<\/a>.<\/p>\n

In October, Trump further battered bilateral ties by downsizing the U.S. Embassy in Cuba<\/a> after U.S. government personnel suffered unexplained health problems there<\/a>. He also expelled 17 Cuban diplomats from Washington.<\/p>\n

Recent Trump appointments do not bode well for the future of U.S.-Cuban relations. The incoming secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, was a vocal opponent<\/a> of Obama\u2019s rapprochement with Havana. And national security adviser John Bolton<\/a> once deemed Cuba part of an \u201caxis of evil,\u201d falsely accusing<\/a> it of developing biological weapons.<\/p>\n

Anticipation and trepidation<\/strong><\/p>\n

In December, I was in Havana, a city where the benefits of Ra\u00fal Castro\u2019s economic reforms are most tangible. Cubans I spoke with there seemed ready for younger leadership and excited about the impending power transition.<\/p>\n

\n
\"\"
Loosened economic restrictions have led to a surge of investment in Havana over the past decade. Pedro Szekely\/flickr, CC BY-SA<\/figcaption><\/figure>
<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

But 80 percent of Cubans have always had a Castro as their president. So the anticipatory mood is leavened by trepidation. People fear that change at the top could bring instability.<\/p>\n

\"TheIf D\u00edaz-Canel can deliver on the economy \u2013 the top priority for most Cubans<\/a> \u2013 he\u2019ll be judged a success. If not, he will face a rising tide of discontent from a population impatient for change.<\/p>\n

William M. LeoGrande, Professor of Government, American University. <\/em>This article was originally published on The Conversation<\/a>. <\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Leadership changes don\u2019t happen often in Cuba \u2013 there\u2019s been just one since 1959, in fact. That was in 2006, when President Fidel Castro fell ill and was replaced by his brother Ra\u00fal. Ra\u00fal Castro turned out to be a real agent of change. But after two terms as president, the 86-year-old is stepping down.…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":124,"featured_media":7223,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"fifu_image_url":"https:\/\/images.theconversation.com\/files\/212692\/original\/file-20180329-189798-1uzjs0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=926&fit=clip","fifu_image_alt":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[192],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6497","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-polity-governance"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6497","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/124"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=6497"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6497\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6499,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6497\/revisions\/6499"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/7223"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=6497"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=6497"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=6497"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}