{"id":10389,"date":"2026-10-06T11:11:12","date_gmt":"2026-10-06T15:11:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/?p=10389"},"modified":"2026-10-06T11:32:13","modified_gmt":"2026-10-06T15:32:13","slug":"brazil-election-authoritarian-right-gain-an-edge-fueled-by-voter-apathy-and-discontent","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/?p=10389","title":{"rendered":"Brazil Election: Authoritarian Right Gain an Edge, Fueled by Voter Apathy and Discontent"},"content":{"rendered":"
Voter casts his ballot with two emblematic symbols of the Brazilian far-right: the national soccer team\u2019s jersey and a doll of current President Lula dressed in a prison garb. Ebb and flow in contemporary politics may be explained through emotional, value-based, and political-ideological dimensions. AP Photo\/Eraldo Peres<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

The far-right bubble that has seen populist rightist figures elected across Latin America spilled over and flooded the ballot box<\/a> in Brazil\u2019s general elections held on Oct. 4, 2026 \u2013 fueled by a discontented and distrustful public. In spite of voting being mandatory in the country for literate citizens aged 18 to 70, a wave of disengagement swept across 33.4 million voters who did not cast a ballot \u2014 21% of the electorate.<\/p>\n

It was the highest abstention rate since 1998<\/a>. We still need to investigate what produces bubbles and waves in contemporary politics, but I have a few tentative hypotheses about this process.<\/p>\n

This kind of ebb and flow has three dimensions: affective, value-based, and political-ideological. The affective dimension is one of depressive sentiments. Three feelings predominate: resentment, anger and political fatigue. Anger stems from the fear of losing what one has and from the aversion generated by feeling neglected by the political leadership in power. Under affective polarization<\/a>, it turns into hatred.<\/p>\n

Political fatigue<\/a>, or social exhaustion, is a state of social weariness and disenchantment arising from the perception that political institutions are no longer capable of providing effective governance or fulfilling long-term commitments. Those who hold governmental power are the primary targets of this adverse sentiment among voters.<\/p>\n

Resentment has been captured by the digital far-right<\/a>. It uses falsehoods and the filtering enabled by algorithms to manipulate these resentments.<\/p>\n

Across the world, fear of the social dislocations brought about by the digital revolution, still in its infancy, fuels depression. The far-right exploits this by stoking hatred against the \u201cother side\u201d, portraying it as responsible for the processes causing loss of social status or threatening further loss.<\/p>\n

Reaction to social inclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n

The values and worldviews dimension<\/a> reflects a strong reaction among people across all social strata to the behavioral changes in society and social inclusion of historically marginalized groups. Inclusion rekindles what I have called the \u201ccasa-grande<\/em> mentality\u201d (a reference to the master\u2019s house in the slavery system that existed in Brazil until the end of the 19th century) in my new book, A Terceira Margem do Ipiranga: Povo, Democracia e Futuro_<\/a> (\u201cThe Third Margin of Ipiranga River: People, Democracy and Future_\u201d, not published in English).<\/p>\n

As for the behavioral changes in society that began in the 20th century and accelerated in the 21st, it has provoked a conservative wave in values and in personal, social<\/a>, sexual<\/a> and political behavior<\/a>, reinforced by extremist religious movements, particularly evangelical neo-charismatic movements<\/a>. This is clearly a reactive, or reactionary, turn aimed at restoring \u201ctraditional values\u201d.<\/p>\n

Political fatigue is directly related to the transformations already reshaping society as the digital revolution advances. New interests, demands and needs are emerging that governments and institutions are unable to represent or address<\/a>.<\/p>\n

A social majority is gradually taking shape, driven by widely differing motivations but sharing the same weary sense that the \u201cestablishment,\u201d or political elite, has nothing to offer but more of the same.<\/p>\n

This sense of political fatigue prompts a search for something \u201cdifferent,\u201d something that presents itself as new. The far-right is mistaken for a force of innovative change, even though I would argue that it fails to understand the present and carries a backward-looking vision, focused on an idealized past rather than the future.<\/p>\n

We have seen this shift to the popular right in recent years across countries around the world, from Europe to Asia and Latin America, including more recently Argentina, Chile and Colombia in the region. How this sociological model should be adjusted to explain what is happening in each country is a question that, in my view, still requires further research. Clearly, every country experiences this moment in its own way.<\/p>\n

In Brazil, political fatigue is directly associated with the country\u2019s multiparty system. The Workers\u2019 Party (PT) of current President Luiz In\u00e1cio Lula da Silva remained in power for 14 uninterrupted years (2003-2016) and, following former president Jair Bolsonaro administration (2018-2022), returned to office for at least another four years (2023-2026), once again under Lula.<\/p>\n

During this period, the alternative that had provided a functional rotation in government, represented by the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) \u2013 which along its history shifted from social democracy toward social liberalism \u2013 lost its ability to field competitive presidential candidates. This happened first in the electoral rupture of 2018 \u2013 the election that brought Jair Bolsonaro to power \u2013 and again in 2022, with Lula\u2019s return.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, PSDB and another center-right party, the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), dwindled in size and influence, while the right-wing Democrats (DEM) merged with the Social Liberal Party (PSL) \u2014 the party Bolsonaro was affiliated when elected in 2018 and subsequently abandoned by him \u2014 to form Uni\u00e3o Brasil, or Brazil Union.<\/p>\n

The disappearance of functional alternatives to Lula\u2019s PT opened the way for the far-right. The Liberal Party (PL) occupied this space in Congress and became competitive in presidential elections. But PL is not committed to the democratic system, and on its rise it swallowed up the right wing parties that, unlike it, were committed to democracy.<\/p>\n

Democracy at risk<\/strong><\/p>\n

My general hypothesis is that nowadays no government, regardless of its political persuasion and in any democratic society, is capable of satisfying a discontented and distrustful public. Within the democratic field, the most likely outcome is high turnover, with a growing number of incumbents failing to win reelection. The far-right can remain in power only if, once in government, it dismantles democratic institutions, especially those responsible for providing the checks and balances necessary to preserve the integrity of democracy.<\/p>\n

Brazil is entering a territory of high risk and democratic threat because the far-right emerged from the elections with formidable strength in Congress, particularly in the Senate, while also securing the largest bloc in the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house in Brazil\u2019s Congress.<\/p>\n

Brazilian far-right now has the means to attack the legal framework underpinning democratic institutions. The crisis within the Federal Supreme Court (STF), deeply divided internally and with several justices owing public explanations for inappropriate conduct of its members, further aggravates the situation.<\/p>\n

Moreover, four Supreme Court justices are due to retire upon reaching the mandatory retirement age, and one seat is still vacant since the Senate rejected President Lula\u2019s nominee earlier this year. With that, the Court risks being overtaken by the far-right on the short term, which would further neutralize its role as a guardian of the Constitution and its checks and balances.\"The<\/p>\n

Sergio Abranches<\/a>, Ex-professor titular do IUPERJ\/Uerj e ex-professor visitante no Departamento de Economia e Administra\u00e7\u00e3o (FEA), Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ)<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n

This article is republished from The Conversation<\/a> under a Creative Commons license.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The far-right bubble that has seen populist rightist figures elected across Latin America spilled over and flooded the ballot box in Brazil\u2019s general elections held on Oct. 4, 2026 \u2013 fueled by a discontented and distrustful public. In spite of voting being mandatory in the country for literate citizens aged 18 to 70, a wave…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":124,"featured_media":10390,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"fifu_image_url":"https:\/\/images.theconversation.com\/files\/763974\/original\/file-20261005-50-on7zs3.jpg?ixlib=rb-4.1.1&rect=0%2C517%2C3775%2C1258&q=75&auto=format&w=1920&h=640&fit=crop&dpr=1","fifu_image_alt":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[192],"tags":[212],"class_list":["post-10389","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-polity-governance","tag-thedailybrieft"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10389","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/124"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=10389"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10389\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":10391,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10389\/revisions\/10391"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/10390"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=10389"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=10389"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/latinamericasecurityreport.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=10389"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}